Gérard Genette occupe une « situation » intermédiaire entre les avant-gardes théoriques des années 1960 et l’histoire littéraire de la tradition lansonienne à la Sorbonne, où il avait commencé sa carrière académique, avant d’amorcer un « tournant rhétorique » dans la filiation de Valéry et de Paulhan. Enseignant la poétique à l’EPHE et à l’EHESS, il a contribué à renouveler profondément la théorie littéraire en France dans les années 1960, aux côtés de Barthes, Todorov, Jakobson et Michel Charles.

Akin to flotsam washed up by the sea, this article combs through what it calls a “molecular configuration” comprised of bits of Paul Valéry, Jean Grenier, Albert Camus, René Char, Martin Heidegger and Georg Trakl as an exercise in “tidal thinking.” Conflict, mainly in the form of war, makes its presence felt throughout, as does the haunting prospect of the irreversible climate crisis.

One task of logic, Peirce held, is to classify arguments so as to determine the validity of each kind. His own classification is interesting because it includes a novel type of argument in addition to the two traditionally recognized types. It is the purpose of this paper to discuss what Peirce thought to be sufficiently distinctive about abduction to warrant calling it a new kind of argument. But since one finds in his writings on abduction a number of different views (...) it is first necessary to make a few remarks concerning the unity of Peirce's thought. (shrink)

Concepts and problems; The calculus of inductive probability; Alternative inductive logics and the justification of induction; Probability and action; The pragmatic theory of inductive probability; The logic of causal statements as a formal language; The logic of causal statements as a model of natural language; The dispositional theory of empirical probability; Cause and chance in space - time systems; The presupposition of theory induction; Chance, cause, and reason.

Because statements like ‘This object is soluble in aqua regia’ involve the causal modalities, we call them causal dispositional statements. Now while this involvement has long been recognized, no thorough examination of its exact nature has ever been made. One purpose of this paper is to begin such an examination. In Sec. 2 we will suggest an analysis of causal dispositional statements, and in Sec. 3 we will discuss some philosophic issues to which this analysis is relevant.

1. Introduction. It is generally admitted that a large part of man's knowledge is based on inductive arguments. Hence any philosophical theory concerning the nature of inductive arguments constitutes an epistemological theory. Any such philosophical theory of induction must, if it is to be satisfactory, take adequate account of Hume's criticism of inductive arguments. One way of treating his criticism is to say that the validity of inductive arguments is in an important sense relative to some broad factual assumptions about (...) the general nature of the universe and that these general factual assumptions are presupposed in a certain way by the users of inductive arguments. Let us call any theory of this general type a postulate theory of induction. (shrink)

This general type of view may be characterized more fully by using the notion of an inductive method. All scientists use approximately the same inductive method, which we will call the standard inductive method. This method is based on the rule of induction by simple enumeration, which may be roughly stated as follows: if it is known only that a certain property Ψ has accompanied another property Φ in a number of instances, then the larger this number of instances the (...) higher the probability that the next occurrence of Φ will be accompanied by Ψ. Though scientists actually reason inductively in accord with this rule, it is important that there are logically consistent inductive methods based on alternative rules. We will describe two of these briefly. The inverse inductive method assigns probabilities according to the rule that if it is known only that Ψ has accompanied Φ a number of times, then the larger the number of instances the lower the probability that the next occurrence of Φ will be accompanied by Ψ. The random predictive method assigns to the proposition that the next occurrence of Φ will be accompanied by Ψ a probability completely independent of the number of times that Ψ has accompanied Φ in the past.. (shrink)

In this resource for educators, Harold F. Burks offers a comprehensive guide to the evaluation techniques and intervention strategies that have worked with many school children experiencing problems. Thus, Diagnosis and Remediation Practices for Troubled School Children attempts to: clarify the understanding of observed, unwanted child behavior symptoms ; investigate with educators and parents—and sometimes children—the possible causal factors that antedate these behavior manifestations; create in cooperation with parents and school personnel, innovative intervention techniques to help children learn accepted (...) behavior patterns. (shrink)

_Biogea_ is a mixture of poetry, philosophy, science, and biography exemplary of the style that has made Michel Serres one of the most extraordinary thinkers of his age. His philosophical and poetic inquiry sings in praise of earth and life, what he names singularly as Biogea. In these times when species are disappearing, when catastrophic events such as earthquakes and tsunamis impale the earth, Serres wonders if anyone “worries about the death pangs of the rivers.” And for Serres, one can (...) ask the same question of philosophy as the humanities increasingly find themselves in need of defenders. Today, all living organisms discover themselves part of this Biogea. “Today we have other neighbors, constituents of the Biogea: the sea, my lover; our mother, the Earth, becomes our daughter; this beautiful breeze which inspires the spirit, a spiritual mistress; our light friends, the fresh and flowing waters.”. (shrink)

Chapitre premier. Le concept de concept : un "concept" à sept composantes -- chapitre II. Statut problématique du concept de concept : le danger d'auto-réfutation -- chapitre III. Renvoi à une instance génétique plus profonde : la question de la pensée pure ... -- chapitre IV. Interférence et autrui dans le discours philosophique.

We distinguish scanning switches, which only enumerate states, from function switches which transform input states into output states. For the latter we introduce a logical network symbolism. Our history of early computer switching begins with the suggestions of Ramon Lull and Gottfried Leibniz, surveys the evolution of mechanical scanning switches and the first mechanical function switches, and then describes the first electromechanical function switches. The main themes of the present paper are that William S. Jevons built the first substantial function (...) switch (his logical piano), and that his work led to the design by Allan Marquand of the first substantial electromechanical function switch, as well as to Charles S. Peirce's idea for an electrical general-purpose programmable computer. These events all occurred fifty years before the first general-purpose programmable computers were constructed (in the 1940's), but they had no influence. (shrink)

This, the last volume in the series, provides the keys to all the others. All letters to and from Burke are listed, and the material in the letters themselves analysed in a comprehensive general index.

How should you live? Should you devote yourself to perfecting a single talent or try to live a balanced life? Should you lighten up and have more fun, or buckle down and try to achieve greatness? Should you try to be a better friend? Should you be self-critical or self-accepting? And how should you decide among the possibilities open to you? Should you consult experts, listen to your parents, or should you do lots of research? Should you make lists of (...) pros and cons, or go with your gut? These are not questions that can be answered in general or in the abstract. Rather, these questions are addressed to the first person point of view, to the perspective each of us occupies when we reflect on how to live without knowing exactly what we're aiming for. To answer them, this book focuses on the process of living one's life from the inside, rather than on defining goals from the outside. Drawing on traditional philosophical sources as well as literature and recent work in social psychology, this book argues that to live well, we need to develop reflective wisdom: to care about things that will sustain us and give us good experiences, to have perspective on our successes and failures, and to be moderately self-aware and cautiously optimistic about human nature. Further, we need to know when to think about our values, character, and choices, and when not to. A crucial part of wisdom, the book maintains, is being able to shift perspectives: to be self-critical; to be realistic; to examine life when reflection is appropriate, but not when we should lose ourselves in experience. (shrink)